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As a novice in a particular domain, the
cognitive feats that experts are capable of
performing seem impressive, even extraor-
dinary. According to the well-established
exemplar theory of categorization (e.g.,
Brooks, 1987; Medin and Ross, 1989), a
new category member in everyday clas-
sification (e.g., a bird, a table, or a car)
or expert classification (e.g., an abnor-
mal chest x-ray, a patient with myocardial
ischaemia, or a poor chess move) is cat-
egorized on the basis of its similarity to
individual prior cases. Often this sensitiv-
ity develops effortlessly and without any
intention to learn similarities or differ-
ences among the exemplars.
Experts can do a lot with a little. Across
various domains of expertise, it seems that
experts can perform quickly and accu-
rately when given only a small amount
of information, as in chess (Gobet and
Charness, 2006); fireground command
(Klein, 1998); radiology (Myles-Worsley
et al., 1988; Evans et al., 2013), and der-
matology (Norman et al., 1989). The expe-
riential knowledge based on the hundreds
of thousands of prior instances serves as a
rich source of analogies to permit efficient
problem solving.
A fruitful approach to understand-
ing these cognitive feats has been to
understand where expertise lies in var-
ious domains. Expertise in ball sports,
for example, seems to lie in anticipating
where the ball will be (Abernethy, 1991);
expertise in wine seems to lie in apply-
ing verbal labels (Hughson and Boakes,
2001); expertise in radiology seems to lie
in rapid discrimination of normal and
abnormal radiographs (Evans et al., 2013);
and expertise in chess seems lie in rapid
retrieval of board configurations from
memory (Chase and Simon, 1973).
Over the last several years, we have
been working with a fascinating group
of experts who spend several hours a
day examining a highly structured set of
impressions. When a fingerprint is found
at a crime scene it is a human exam-
iner, not a machine, who is faced with
the task of identifying the person who
left it. Professional fingerprint examin-
ers are usually sworn police officers who
use image enhancement tools, such as
Photoshop or a physical magnifying glass,
and database tools to provide a list of
possible matching candidates. They place
a crime scene print and a suspect print
side-by-side—physically or on a computer
screen—and visually compare the prints to
judge whether the prints came from the
same person or two different people.
These fingerprint examiners have tes-
tified in court for over one hundred
years, but there have been few experi-
ments directly investigating the extent to
which experts can correctly match fin-
gerprints to one another, how competent
and proficient fingerprint experts are, how
examiners make their decisions, or the fac-
tors that affect performance (Loftus and
Cole, 2004; Saks and Koehler, 2005; Vokey
et al., 2009; Spinney, 2010b; Thompson
et al., 2013a). Indeed, many examiners
have even claimed that fingerprint iden-
tification is infallible (Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 1984). Academics, judges,
scientists, and US Senators have reported
on the absence of solid scientific prac-
tices in the forensic sciences. They high-
light the absence of experiments on human
expertise in forensic pattern matching,
suggesting that faulty analyses may be
contributing to wrongful convictions of
innocent people (Edwards, 2009; National
Research Council, 2009; Campbell, 2011;
Carle, 2011; Expert Working Group on
Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis,
2012; Maxmen, 2012), and they lament
the lack of a research culture in the foren-
sic sciences (Mnookin et al., 2011). The
field of forensics is, however, beginning to
acknowledge the central role that fallible
humans play in the identification process
(Tangen, 2013).
Our first point of inquiry was to see
whether qualified, court practicing finger-
print examiners are any more accurate
than the person on the street, and to get a
feel for the kinds of errors examinersmake.
In our first experiment (Tangen et al.,
2011), we tested the matching accuracy
of fingerprint examiners from Australian
state and federal law enforcement agencies.
In a signal detection paradigm, we cre-
ated ground-truth matching prints for use
as targets, and highly-similar, nonmatch-
ing prints from a national database search
for use as distractors. We found that qual-
ified, court-practicing fingerprint experts
were exceedingly accurate compared with
novices. Experts tended to err on the side
of caution by making more errors of the
sort that could allow a guilty person to
escape detection than errors of the sort
that could falsely incriminate an inno-
cent person. A similar experiment, with
participants from the US Federal Bureau
of Investigation, produced similar results
(Ulery et al., 2011), and a follow-up exper-
iment found variability in the consistency
within and between examiners’ decisions
(Ulery et al., 2012). An examiner’s exper-
tise seems to lie, not in matching prints
per se, but in discriminating highly similar
but nonmatching prints (Thompson et al.,
2013a).
In a follow-up experiment (Thompson
et al., 2013b), we replicated (Tangen
www.frontiersin.org July 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 737 | 1
Thompson et al. Expertise in fingerprint discrimination
et al., 2011) but with genuine crime scene
matching prints from casework (where the
ground truth is uncertain), and with the
addition of two trainee participant groups.
Intermediate trainees—despite their lack
of qualification and average 3.5 years’
experience—performed about as accu-
rately as qualified experts who had an
average 17.5 year’s experience. It appears
that people can learn to distinguishmatch-
ing from similar nonmatching prints to
roughly the same level of accuracy as
experts after a few years of experience
and training. New trainees—despite their
5-week, full-time training course or their
6 months experience—were not any bet-
ter than novices at discriminating match-
ing and similar nonmatching prints, they
were just more conservative. It appears
that early training and/or experience may
not necessarily result in more accurate
judgments, but may simply result in a
more conservative response bias. Again we
concluded that the superior performance
of experts was a result of their ability to
identify the highly similar, but nonmatch-
ing fingerprints as such.
What the findings mean for reason-
ing about expert performance in the wild
is an open question (e.g., Koehler, 2008,
2012; Mnookin, 2008; Thompson et al.,
2013a), but these findings do contradict
the notion that fingerprint identification is
infallible, and that the fingerprint identifi-
cation “methodology” can be disembodied
from a judgment about whether two fin-
gerprints match or not.
Our second point of inquiry was to
understand the nature of expertise in fin-
gerprint matching—to understand where
a fingerprint examiner’s expertise lies.
Through experience and feedback, an
expert can rapidly retrieve, from memory,
previous instances and decisions relevant
to the current situation, whereas novices
rely more on formal rules and proce-
dures (Brooks, 2005; Norman et al., 2007).
Fingerprint examiners claim that careful,
deliberate analysis is the basis of the work
that they do (Busey and Parada, 2010),
but a hallmark of genuine expertise is the
ability to accurately perform a domain rel-
evant task quickly (Kahneman and Klein,
2009). Do fingerprint examiners rely on
the same non-analytic cognitive processes
as experts in other domains of expertise?
Busey et al. (2011) found that experts
move their eyes differently from novices,
and Busey and Vanderkolk (2005) found
that experts performed better than novices
at identifying the matching fragments of
fingerprints in noise after a short delay.
They also found that inverted fingerprints
produced a delayed N170 event-related
potential response in experts but not in
novices, suggesting that experts process
upright fingerprints configurally (Busey
and Parada, 2010).
In a series of experiments, we further
examined the nature of fingerprint exper-
tise (Thompson, 2014). We added artificial
noise to all the print pairs, and inverted
half and kept the other half upright,
and found that experts could discriminate
prints even when the prints were highly
noisy. Unexpectedly, fingerprint experts
did not show the classic inversion effect
seen in face recognition. We tested the
short term memory of experts and novices
by separating fingerprint pairs in time by
a few seconds, and found that experts were
better than novices at discriminating print,
and that experts were far better at discrim-
inating similar, nonmatching prints. We
tested the long term memory of experts
and novices by asking them to learn a set
of fingerprints to be recognized a few min-
utes later, but found no difference in long
term memory accuracy between experts
and novices, and both groups performed
around the level of chance. We tested the
ability of experts and novices to discrimi-
nate prints by presenting them briefly on
screen, and found that experts could accu-
rately discriminate prints when presented
for just 2000ms, and the largest differ-
ence between experts and novices was on
similar, nonmatching prints. We then fur-
ther reduced the stimuli presentation time,
and found that experts were more accurate
than novices overall, and that experts had
a much better idea about whether a pair
of prints match or not in a rapid period of
time. With such short presentation times
(i.e., from 250 to 2000ms), there is little
time to engage in careful, deliberate anal-
ysis of the minutiae in a fingerprint image
in order to make accurate decisions.
These findings suggest that fingerprint
experts are capable of making accurate
decisions when the amount of visual
information in the prints is dramatically
decreased. It is clear that, through expe-
rience, experts can learn the regularities
of matching and nonmatching prints, and
rapidly compare new prints to memory
in order to make accurate judgments. The
findings above are in stark contrast to the
common and consistent claims in formal
training, textbooks, and courtroom testi-
mony: that fingerprint identification is a
“scientific process” that requires careful,
thorough analysis in order for judgments
to be accurate.
Fingerprint expertise is particularly
interesting because of the sheer amount
of experience that examiners have with
the stimuli. Their full-time job, often in
departments that run 24 hours a day, is
to visually compare crime scene prints to
suspect and database candidates. It’s dif-
ficult to imagine any other domain in
which there is so much attention and
exposure to a highly constrained stimu-
lus, where the task is to definitively report
that two images come from the same, sin-
gle source or not. And the stakes are high:
innocent people could be wrongly con-
victed, and guilty people could be wrongly
acquitted.
This vast experience allows experts to
resolve information in a print: to cor-
rectly regard ambiguous information that
is more consistent with within-source vari-
ability as a “match,” and correctly regard
ambiguous information that is more con-
sistent with between-source variability as
a “non-match.” An ambiguous mark on a
fingerprint, for example, can be regarded
as signal (i.e., as evidence of a “match”), or
it can be disregarded as noise (i.e., as evi-
dence of a “non-match”). This kind of pro-
cess is undoubtedly operating in novices
too, but the ambiguity cannot be suffi-
ciently resolved unless the examiner has
accumulated enough matching and non-
matching exemplars in memory to point
to one direction or the other. One clear
result of this vast experience is the experts’
capacity to disregard, to “see through” the
ambiguity and surface structure of similar
prints and discriminate them accurately.
We think that further study of the nature
of fingerprint expertise will inform general
theories for the development of expertise,
while also providing an empirical basis for
claims made by expert witnesses in the
courtroom.
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